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1. Introduction
It is standardly assumed that a close relationship holds between (i) the learnability
of languages with some property P, and (ii) the existence of languages with prop-
erty P as revealed by typological studies. If it is not possible for a human to acquire
a language with P, then clearly no speakers will be found of any language with P.
The inverse, though not logically necessary, is often also implicitly thought to be
true: that if no natural language exists with P, then languages with P are unlearn-
able. This is not without reason, of course. Since the question of how children
manage to acquire their native languages as quickly as they do is still largely unan-
swered, linguists are interested in discovering possible constraints on the learner’s
hypothesis space, for which typological generalisations would seem to make good
candidates.1 Assuming that we would like the formalisms used to describe natural
language semantics to have the ability to express all and only the languages that
human beings can naturally acquire, discoveries about constraints on the learner’s
hypothesis space in turn dictate which formalisms are too powerful and which are
too weak.
In this paper we examine the relationship between learnability and typology
in the area of determiner meanings. We begin with two generalisations about the
meanings that determiners of the world’s languages are found to have, and inves-
tigate the learnability of fictional determiners with unattested meanings. If partici-
pants in our experiments fail to learn such determiners, then this would suggest that
they are unattested because they are unlearnable. If, on the other hand, participants
are able to learn the determiners in question, then some other explanation for their
absence in the languages of the world is necessary.
Specifically, the generalisations we consider are (i) that all natural language
determiners are conservative, and (ii) that no natural language has a determiner
analogous to most that expresses “less than half” rather than “more than half”. The
standard formal tools used to describe determiner meanings are powerful enough to
express both kinds of unattested determiner meanings. This is undesirable if they
are indeed unlearnable. We find that learnability correlates with (i), whereas it does
not with (ii). Thus the lack of nonconservative determiners in the world’s languages
Thanks to Bill Idsardi, Paul Pietroski and Alexander Williams for helpful advice; to Imogen
Davidson White and Nathan Ycas for help organising and running many of our child subjects; and
to the parents and children at the Center for Young Children at the University of Maryland.
1See Chomsky (1965: p.55), Chomsky (1975: p.37), among many others.
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can plausibly be put down to the fact that they are unlearnable, and we should strive
for a formalisation of determiner meanings which precludes their occurrence. But
the fact that no less than half determiner has been discovered can not be explained
by the same logic, and so there is no reason to disprefer formalisms in which it can
be expressed.
In Section 2 we briefly review the relevant theoretical background and present
the two typological generalisations we will investigate, and then turn, in Section 3
and Section 4, to experiments testing the learnability of unattested determiners.
2. Formal Properties of Determiners
We take determiners to be those words that may occur in the syntactic frame illus-
trated in (1),2 and assume that they express a relation between the two sets denoted
by the determiner’s two arguments (Mostowski 1957) as shown in (2).
(1)
Det
every
some
most
N
dog(s)
is/are brown
(2) a. JeveryK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ X ⊆ Y
b. JsomeK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ X ∩Y 6= ∅
c. JmostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |X ∩Y |> |X −Y |
When the determiners of the world’s languages are analysed in this way
— associating each with a binary relation on sets — a surprising generalisation
emerges: every attested determiner expresses a relation that is conservative, as de-
fined in (3) (Barwise and Cooper 1981, Higginbotham and May 1981, Keenan and
Stavi 1986).3
(3) A two-place relation on sets R is conservative if and only if the following
biconditional is true: R(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ R(X)(X ∩Y )
The English determiner every is conservative because every dog is brown
has the same truth condition as every dog is a brown dog; or, more formally:
2We remain agnostic about many of the details of the syntax of these sentences, and for this
reason limit our attention to quantifiers in subject positions. What is important for us is that “deter-
miner” is defined distributionally.
3Two apparent counterexamples are only and many. Closer examination quickly shows that only
is not a determiner, as defined distributionally. While at first only dogs are brown looks superfically
like some dogs are brown, only can appear in many other positions where some and every cannot,
eg. dogs only/*some/*every are brown, and dogs are only/*some/*every brown. The case of many
is less clear, complicated by context-dependence, but can also plausibly be made to fit with the
conservativity generalisation; see e.g. Keenan and Stavi (1986) and Herburger (1997).
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(4) JeveryK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ X ⊆Y ⇐⇒ X ⊆ (X ∩Y ) ⇐⇒ JeveryK(X)(X ∩Y )
It is a simple matter to define a determiner just like every, but with its argu-
ments reversed — call it grevery, defined in (5), such that grevery dog is brown is
equivalent to every brown thing is a dog — that is not conservative.
(5) JgreveryK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ Y ⊆ X ⇐⇒ JeveryK(Y )(X)
Here, while it is the case that JgreveryK(X)(X ∩Y ) is always true, JgreveryK(X)(Y)
is not, so the biconditional in (3) does not hold. No attested determiner has this
meaning.
A nonconservative determiner need not be the “reverse” of a conservative
determiner. Another fictional nonconservative determiner that one can imagine is
equi, defined in (6).4
(6) JequiK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |X |= |Y |
Thus equi dogs are brown would mean that there are exactly as many dogs as there
are brown things. Since this is certainly not equivalent to the statement that there
are exactly as many dogs as there are brown dogs, equi is not conservative.
It should be clear that the standard formal tools used here are equally ca-
pable of representing both conservative and nonconservative determiners. Ideally,
we would like determiners with all and only the meanings that the human language
faculty allows to be statable in our semantic theory. If the absence of nonconser-
vative determiners cross-linguistically is due to an inability of the language faculty
to associate such meanings with sentences of the form in (1), a view we claim our
experimental results support, then the standard toolkit “overgenerates” determiner
meanings, and we should strive for an alternative which does not.5 The equi ex-
ample is a particularly striking instance of a relation that seems to be a “basic” or
“simple” one that we would expect to find a determiner expressing, if the space of
possible determiner meanings is precisely the space of binary relations on sets.
A second surprising absence from the world’s languages is a determiner —
call it fost — that is analogous to most but expresses “less than (half)” rather than
“more than (half)”. This is defined in (7); compare with most in (2).
(7) JfostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |X ∩Y |< |X−Y |
This determiner is conservative, since it depends on the same two sets as does most,6
but is nonetheless unattested (Hackl 2009). This is rather striking when one consid-
ers that it is so minimally different from most, (an equivalent of) which, while not
widespread, does appear in a number of natural languages (Hackl 2009).
4Thanks to Paul Pietroski (p.c.) for this example.
5Some alternatives that depart from the standard and eliminate this overgeneration have been
proposed by Pietroski (2005), Bhatt and Pancheva (2007), and Fox (2002).
6Note that fost is not the “reverse” of most in the way that grevery is the reverse of every. That
determiner, which one might call grmost, would be defined as:
JgrmostK(X)(Y ) ⇐⇒ |Y ∩X |> |Y −X | ⇐⇒ JmostK(Y )(X)
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This, in combination with the fact that most is the only attested determiner
that is not expressible in first-order logic (Barwise and Cooper 1981), prompted
Hackl (2009) to suggest that most may not be an atomic determiner, but rather a
complex expression constructed from morphemes more and -est, in such a way
that does not likewise permit less and -est to form a complex determiner with the
meaning of fost. He explains the fact that fost is unattested by proposing a theory
in which it is not expressible, while at the same time making it possible to restrict
atomic determiner meanings to just those expressible in first-order logic — certainly
two desirable consequences. The results of our experiments, however, indicate that
fost is learnable, so Hackl’s theory appears to be too restrictive. An explanatorily
adequate theory must be able to express the meaning of fost, even if no natural
language makes use of this option.7
We present our experiments concerning the learnability of nonconservative
determiners and the learnability of fost in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively.
3. Experiment 1: Conservativity
This experiment is also reported in Hunter and Conroy (2009).
7Of course, this leaves open the question of why it is that no natural language has a determiner
with the meaning of fost, but we believe that its learnability is reason enough to prefer formalisms
in which it is expressible. There are other conceivable approaches: if the absence of fost is for
some pragmatic or functional reason, for example, one could choose to strive for a formalism that
enforces the pragmatic or functional pressures which prevent fost from naturally occurring. But we
follow convention in assuming that the goal of linguistic theory is to characterise possible states of
the human mind, and our results reported below suggest that human minds can, albeit artificially,
enter into a state where a word with the syntactic distribution of a determiner has the meaning of
fost.
Horn (1972) argues for a lexicalisation constraint that rules out a class of quantifiers, possibly
including those of the form fost X , on the basis of their pragmatic inferentiability from an extant
paradigm, so that a language gets “only those lexical items it actually needs” (p. 251). His demon-
stration centers around the possibility of lexicalising quantifiers along with negation, observing that
across domains (e.g. nominal and modal quantification, the binary connectives) there is lexicali-
sation of ¬∃ ≡ ∀¬ (e.g. none) but not of ∃¬ ≡ ¬∀. This generalisation accounts for the fact that
devices for expressing ¬∀ on a given scale come for free with any assertion containing that scale’s
existential quantifier, via implicature. As is (by now) commonly assumed, an assertion of Some girls
called implicates Some girls didn’t call or, equivalently, Not all girls called. Simplifying somewhat,
Horn predicts that if it is true that ∃ implicates ∃¬, then ∃¬ ≡ ¬∀ will not lexicalise. This account
correctly predicts the absence of the quantifier we label nall on pragmatic grounds, thus not preclud-
ing its learnability. It likewise predicts the absence of ¬most, but does not predict the absence of
most¬, although both are unattested in natural languages. Since¬JmostK(X)(Y ) and JmostK(X)(¬Y )
differ in truth value only if |Y ∩X | = |Y −X |, and we do not consider this case in our experiments
on fost, nothing we have done determines whether by fost we mean ¬most or most¬. So one can
think of our experiment as testing whether either ¬most or most¬ is learnable; and it remains an
open question whether the absence of the determiner we show to be learnable can be explained by
Horn’s pragmatic restrictions.
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3.1. Two novel determiners: nall and grall
The question we address is whether children permit structures like (1) to have non-
conservative meanings. While it has been shown that children will sometimes ac-
cept non-adult-like interpretations of quantificational sentences (Inhelder and Piaget
1964), previous research is silent with respect to the specific question of conserva-
tivity.8 To investigate this question, we attempted to teach children novel deter-
miners. If children have no inherent restrictions on determiner meanings, then we
would predict that they will be able to learn both novel conservative determiners
and novel nonconservative determiners. However, if the typological generalisation
that we observe reflects a restriction imposed by the language faculty, then we pre-
dict that children will succeed in learning novel conservative determiners, and will
not succeed in learning novel nonconservative determiners.
To test these predictions we created two novel determiners, one conservative
and one nonconservative. The conservative one, nall, is defined in (8).
(8) JnallK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ X 6⊆Y ⇐⇒ ¬(X ⊆Y )
So nall girls are on the beach is the negation of every girl is on the beach: we might
paraphrase it as not all girls are on the beach. For example, it is true in the scene
shown in Figure 1(a), but false in the scene shown in Figure 1(b). Since nall is the
“negation” of the conservative determiner every, it is also conservative9.
The novel nonconservative determiner, grall, is defined in (9).
(9) JgrallK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ Y 6⊆ X ⇐⇒ ¬(Y ⊆ X) ⇐⇒ JnallK(Y )(X)
So grall girls are on the beach is the “reverse” of not all girls are on the beach: it is
true if and only if not all beach-goers are girls. For example, it is true in the scene
shown in Figure 1(b), but false in the scene shown in Figure 1(a). Since the “lived
on” set (the beach-goers) is not expressed as the internal argument of grall, grall
8The common finding of “symmetrical responses” in studies of universal quantification (Inhelder
and Piaget 1964, Philip 1995, Drozd and van Loosbroek 1998) do not speak to a hypothesised con-
servativity constraint. This common finding is that some children judge a sentence like every boy is
riding an elephant to be true if and only if (i) every boy is riding an elephant, and (ii) every elephant
is ridden by a boy. On this reading, every is not expressing a two-place relation between the set of
boys (the denotation of its internal argument) and the set of elephant riders (the denotation of its
external argument, is riding an elephant); and if it is not expressing a two-place relation between
these two sets, then it is certainly not expressing a nonconservative relation between them (like equi
does). On the (questionable) assumption that every was indeed being analysed as a determiner in
these sentences, this finding would be evidence against the standard restriction on determiner mean-
ings that permits only relations between the sets denoted by their internal and external arguments —
let alone the stronger restriction to only conservative relations — perhaps in favour of an account
involving quantification over elephant-riding events as in Philip (1995) or over elephants as in Drozd
and van Loosbroek (1998). But further experiments have suggested that these interpretations are a
methodological artifact resulting from infelicitous contexts in any case (Crain et al. 1996).
9Suppose that R is conservative, and that R ′(X)(Y )≡ ¬R(X)(Y ). Then
R
′(X)(Y ) ⇐⇒ ¬R(X)(Y ) ⇐⇒ ¬R(X)(X ∩Y ) ⇐⇒ R ′(X)(X ∩Y )
so R ′ is also conservative.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Two sample cards from Experiment 1. In the conservative condition, the
puppet would like only the card in (a): nall girls are on the beach is true in (a), but
false in (b). In the nonconservative condition, the puppet would like only the card
in (b): grall girls are on the beach is false in (a), but true in (b).
is not conservative.10
Our experiment compares children’s ability to learn nall with their ability
to learn grall, based on equivalent input. Note that since the conditions expressed
by these two determiners are just the “mirror image” of each other, there is no
reason to expect a difference in how easily they can be learnt — unless there are
constraints on the semantic significance of being the internal or external argument
of a determiner, since this is all that distinguishes nall from grall. A finding that
children are able to learn nall but not grall would therefore be difficult to explain by
any means other than such a restriction on the way internal and external arguments
of determiners are interpreted.
3.2. Experiment design and methodology
Each participant was assigned randomly to one of two conditions: the conservative
condition or the nonconservative condition. Participants in the conservative condi-
tion were trained on nall, and participants in the nonconservative condition were
trained on grall; each participant was then tested on whether he/she had learnt the
determiner he/she was exposed to.
To assess the participants’ success in learning, we used a variant of the
“picky puppet task” (Waxman and Gelman 1986). The task involves two experi-
menters. One experimenter controls a “picky puppet”, who likes some cards but
not others. The second experimenter places the cards that the puppet likes in one
pile, and the cards that the puppet does not like in a second pile. The child’s task
is to make a generalisation about what kinds of cards the puppet likes, and subse-
quently “help” the second experimenter by placing cards into the appropriate piles.
The experimental session was divided into two phases: warm-up and target.
During the warm-up phase, the experimenter ensured that the child could sort cards
into piles. For example, in one warm-up item the child would be told “The puppet
only likes cards with yellow things on them”, and would be asked to sort a number
of cards into “like” and “doesn’t like” piles. The warm-up phase contained three
10The fact that grall happens to live on its external argument makes it anticonservative — unlike
equi, which is neither conservative nor anticonservative — but this is not relevant here.
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items; the cards, and the criterion to be met for the puppet to like them, differed
from each item to the next.
The target phase used cards like those shown in Figure 1, and was divided
into a training period and a test period. The child was told that the puppet had
revealed to the experimenter whether he liked or disliked some of the cards, but not
all of them. The child was told that the experimenter would sort what they could,
but that the child would then have to help by sorting the remaining cards that the
puppet was silent about. During the training period the experimenter sorted five
cards, according to the criterion appropriate for the condition: in the conservative
condition, the puppet likes cards where nall girls are on the beach is true, and in
the nonconservative condition, the puppet likes cards where grall girls are on the
beach is true. The experimenter placed each card into the appropriate pile in front
of the participant, providing either (10a) or (10b) as an explanation as appropriate.
Note that whatever the determiner being tested, it was pronounced gleeb; the names
nall and grall have been used solely for expository convenience in this paper.
(10) a. The puppet told me that he likes this card because gleeb girls are on the
beach.
b. The puppet told me that he doesn’t like this card because it’s not true that
gleeb girls are on the beach.11
Having placed all the training cards (those that “the puppet had told the
experimenters about”) in the appropriate piles, the experimenter turned the task over
to the child for the test period. The experimenter handed five new cards to the child,
one at a time, and asked the child to put the card in the appropriate pile, depending
on whether or not the child thought the puppet liked the card. The experimenters
recorded which cards the child sorted correctly and incorrectly with respect to the
criterion used during training. The cards that the experimenter had sorted during
the training period remained visible throughout the testing period.
The same training cards and the same testing cards were used in both con-
ditions, though whether the puppet liked or disliked the card varied from one con-
dition to the other. Table 1 shows, for each card, the number of girls and boys on
the beach and on the grass, and whether each condition’s relevant criterion is met or
not. These were designed to be as varied as possible, while maintaining the prag-
matic felicity of the two crucial target statements. The total number of characters
on each card was also kept as close to constant as possible: either five or six for
each card. The number of training cards that the puppet likes is the same in each
condition (three), so the situation that the participant is presented with during the
training phase is analogous across conditions.
The participants were 20 children, aged 4;5 to 5;6 (mean 5;0). Each condi-
tion contained 10 children: ages of those in the conservative condition ranged from
4;5 to 5;5 (mean 4;11), and ages of those in the nonconservative condition ranged
from 4;11 to 5;3 (mean 5;1). The two groups did not differ significantly in age
(t =−1.4141, df = 18, p > 0.174).
11Negation was always expressed in a separate clause to avoid any undesired scopal interactions.
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Card beach grass nall girls are
on the beach
grall girls are
on the beachboys girls boys girls
Train 1 2 0 1 2 true true
Train 2 0 2 3 0 false false
Train 3 0 1 2 3 true false
Train 4 2 3 0 0 false true
Train 5 2 1 1 2 true true
Test 1 3 0 0 2 true true
Test 2 0 3 3 0 false false
Test 3 2 3 0 2 true true
Test 4 1 2 2 0 false true
Test 5 1 2 0 2 true true
Table 1: The distribution of girls and boys on each card in Experiment 1
Condition Conservative Nonconservative
Cards correctly sorted (out of 5) above chance at chance
(p < 0.0001, mean 4.1) (p > 0.2488, mean 3.1)
Subjects with “perfect” accuracy 50% 10%
Table 2: Summary of results from Experiment 1
3.3. Results
The results indicate that children exposed to the novel conservative determiner suc-
cessfully learnt it, and that children exposed to the novel nonconservative deter-
miner did not. The results are summarised in Table 2.
First we can consider how many cards children in the two conditions sorted
correctly. If children never succeeded in learning the determiner’s meaning, we
would expect performance to be at chance (namely 2.5 cards correctly sorted out
of 5). Children in the conservative condition performed significantly better than
chance (χ = ., df = 5, p < 0.0001), sorting an average of 4.1 cards correctly,
whereas children in the nonconservative condition did not (χ = ., df = 5,
p > 0.2488), sorting an average of 3.1 cards correctly.
Alternatively, we can consider how many children in each condition per-
formed “perfectly”, sorting all five test cards correctly. Of the children in the con-
servative condition, five out of ten sorted all test cards correctly, whereas only one
child out of ten in the nonconservative condition sorted all test cards correctly, indi-
cating a correlation between conservativity of the determiner and success in learn-
ing (p = 0.07, Fisher’s exact test).
The results are even more telling when we look more closely at the re-
sponses of the one child who sorted all five test cards correctly in the nonconserva-
tive condition. This child told the experimenters that the puppet was confused about
which characters on the cards were boys and which were girls. Recall that in this
condition the true criterion for the puppet to like a card was grall girls are on the
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beach, or equivalently not all beach-goers are girls. But another statement equiva-
lent to these is some boys are on the beach. So if the child thought that the puppet
intended the internal argument of the determiner in the crucial sentence to denote
the set of boys, then she in fact learnt a conservative meaning for gleeb, with a
meaning like some has. One might even be tempted to suggest that she was led to
believe that the puppet was confusing boys with girls because of a requirement that
gleeb be understood conservatively.
Of course, these results should only bear on the issue of determiner mean-
ings to the extent that we are confident that the participants really did understand
the relevant parts of the explanations in (10) to have the structure shown in (1). Had
we found no difference between the conservative and nonconservative conditions,
one might be hesitant to reject the hypothesis that determiners are restricted to con-
servative meanings, because of the possibility that participants were not analysing
the crucial word as a determiner. But it is unlikely that we would have found results
consistent with the independently motivated restriction to conservative determiner
meanings if participants had not been using determiner structures.
4. Experiment 2: fost
4.1. Experiment design and methodology
In this experiment we investigate the learnability of the fictional determiner fost,
introduced in Section 2. The methodology differs only slightly from that used in
Experiment 1. These differences were generally due to the increased complexity of
fost over nall and grall: it requires comparisons of non-zero cardinalities (or equiv-
alent), rather than mere detection of the presence of girls/boys on the beach/grass.
(Note that knowing only whether each number is zero or non-zero in Table 1 is
sufficient to determine the truth or falsity of either of the sentences investigated in
Experiment 1.)
First, the number of cards was increased: we now use six training cards
instead of five, and twelve testing cards instead of five. Seeing a larger number of
cards sorted is necessary to distinguish between candidate sorting procedures, both
from the point of view of the participant figuring out the puppet’s criterion during
the training phase, and from that of the experimenter figuring out what a participant
thinks gleeb means on the basis of their sorting of testing cards.
Second, the pictures on the cards were modified. A sample card is shown
in Figure 2. The layout was changed to make grouping of characters by gender
or by location equally salient, with each card effectively showing a two-by-two
“grid”.12 On every card, no “cell” in this grid ({girls,boys}×{beach,grass}) was
ever empty. As soon as one training card had been placed in the “like” pile and one
in the “dislike” pile, the participant is able to determine that the novel determiner
being tested must rely on comparisons between non-zero cardinalities.
12Note that the layout used in Experiment 1, if anything, biases the participant towards grouping
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Two sample cards from Experiment 2. The relevant sentence, fost girls
are on the beach, is true in (a) but false in (b); so in this experiment the puppet likes
the card in (a) but not the card in (b).
Table 3 shows, for each card, the number of girls and boys on the beach and
on the grass. In this experiment we only test one novel determiner, fost (always
pronounced gleeb, as in Experiment 1), and the truth value of the relevant sentence
is shown for each card.13 The number of characters in each “cell” was either 4, 8 or
12. Numbers smaller than four were avoided so that none of the sets’ cardinalities
could be compared within the subitisable range (Kaufman et al. 1949, Mandler and
Shebo 1982, Trick and Pylyshyn 1994, Le Corre and Carey 2007).
In this experiment we tested both children and adults. In the case of chil-
dren, the training cards sorted by the experimenter remained visible in their piles
throughout the testing period as for Experiment 1, whereas for adults each training
card was removed from sight before the next was presented. This was intended
to make it difficult to detect the relevant generalisation just by examining all six
training cards sorted, without taking any notice of the novel determiner.
We tested 12 children and 12 adults using the gleeb paradigm as described
for Experiment 1 (i.e. with explanations as shown in (10)). In addition, we tested
another 12 adults in a “no information” condition, and another 12 adults in a “full
information” condition. In the “no information” condition, the explanations given
by the experimenter while sorting the training cards were as shown in (11); in the
“full information” condition the explanations given were as in (12).
(11) a. The puppet told me that he likes this card.
b. The puppet told me that he doesn’t like this card.
of characters by location (rather than by gender), thus towards a nonconservative interpretation of
the novel determiner. The new layout is intended to avoid any bias in either direction.
13In Experiment 1 the crucial comparison was between participants’ success learning nall and
their success learning grall. There is no minimally different fictional neighbour to fost, so we must
use different methods to evaluate participants responses when trained and tested on fost. See the
discussion of results, below. (Using the non-fictional neighbour most as the meaning of gleeb for
half the participants, so that analysis could proceed as for Experiment 1, would not necessarily be
useful since participants trained on most may benefit from the existence of a determiner with this
meaning in their lexicon.)
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Card beach grass fost girls are on the beachboys girls boys girls
Train 1 4 8 8 12 true
Train 2 12 8 8 4 false
Train 3 12 12 4 4 false
Train 4 12 4 4 12 true
Train 5 12 4 8 8 true
Train 6 4 12 8 8 false
Test 1 8 8 4 12 true
Test 2 4 12 12 4 false
Test 3 8 12 4 8 false
Test 4 4 4 12 12 true
Test 5 8 8 12 4 false
Test 6 4 4 12 8 true
Test 7 8 12 8 4 false
Test 8 8 4 12 8 true
Test 9 12 8 4 12 true
Test 10 4 8 12 4 false
Test 11 12 12 4 8 false
Test 12 8 4 8 12 true
Table 3: The distribution of girls and boys on each card in Experiment 2
(12) a. The puppet told me that he likes this card because less than half of the
girls are on the beach.
b. The puppet told me that he doesn’t like this card because it’s not true that
less than half of the girls are on the beach.
The participants were 12 children, aged 4;0 to 5;5 (mean 4;7), and 36 Uni-
versity of Maryland undergraduates. Adults received either course credit or pay-
ment for participation.
4.2. Results
To begin we consider the three adult conditions, which vary only in the amount of
information provided about the puppet’s sorting criterion during the training phase.
The crucial comparison will be between the “no information” condition, where par-
ticipants are provided with no information beyond the distribution of training cards
into “like” and “dislike” piles, and the gleeb condition, where they know in addition
that the relevant criterion can be expressed as gleeb girls are on the beach. Partici-
pants in the gleeb condition therefore have a strictly smaller hypothesis space than
do those in the “no information” condition, since they are limited to criteria that can
be expressed by a natural language determiner. We would expect this reduction of
the hypothesis space to be helpful if and only if the relevant criterion is in it — that
is, if and only if fost is a possible natural language determiner.
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To analyse the results we categorise participants according to the hypothesis
about the puppet’s “liking criterion” which he/she most likely adopted, given his/her
pattern of responses to the test cards. Four possible hypotheses we consider are in
(13).
(13) a. most: The puppet likes a card iff most girls are on the beach.
JmostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |X ∩Y |> |X −Y |
b. fost: The puppet likes a card iff fost girls are on the beach.
JfostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |X ∩Y |< |X −Y |
c. grmost: The puppet likes a card iff grmost girls are on the beach.
JgrmostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |Y ∩X |> |Y −X | ⇐⇒ JmostK(Y )(X)
d. grfost: The puppet likes a card iff grfost girls are on the beach.
JgrfostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ |Y ∩X |< |Y −X | ⇐⇒ JfostK(Y )(X)
In addition, we consider the possibility that a participant did not adopt any such
specific hypothesis about the puppet (e.g. as a result of not being able to detect the
relevant generalisation across the training cards), and sorted the test cards randomly.
We therefore have five possible hypotheses in total. The choice of how to classify
each participant was made on the basis of Bayes Factor model selection: we judge
a participant to have adopted hypothesis H i iff Ki j ≥  for all other hypotheses
H j, j 6= i, where Ki j is the Bayes factor corresponding to the choice between H i
and H j.14 Note that some participants will remain unclassified on this criterion (but
as we will see, this is rare in our results).
Figure 3 shows, for each of the three adult conditions, the number of par-
ticipants classified according to each of the five hypotheses. Unsurprisingly, in the
“full information” condition, participants overwhelmingly responded according to
the fost hypothesis. In the “no information” condition, many participants (seven) re-
sponded according to the “random” hypothesis: these participants were apparently
14Intuitively, this means we took a participant to have adopted hypothesis H i iff it is at least three
times more likely that this participant adopted H i than it is that he/she adopted any other hypothesis;
the factor of 3 is the accepted threshold for the evidence to be considered “substantial” (Jeffreys
1961) (in much the same way as p < 0.05 is the accepted threshold for “significance” in hypothesis
testing). More specifically,
Ki j =
Pr(D|H i)
Pr(D|H j)
where D is the participant’s sequence of responses (twelve responses, one for each testing card). This
value is equivalent to Pr(Hi |D)Pr(H j |D) on the assumption of a uniform prior distribution over hypotheses. In
the case of the four hypotheses corresponding to determiners, we assumed a 10 percent “error rate”:
that is, if a participant adopts a determiner det, we assume that for each card the probability of
sorting the card in accordance with det is 910 . (This is necessary to avoid the probabilities Pr(D|H)
from going straight to zero whenever one response in D disagrees with H.) Thus if the sequence
of responses D contains n responses in accordance with det, and therefore 12− n responses that
disagree with det, then
Pr(D|Hdet) =
( 

)
n
( 

)
−n
The random hypothesis represents guessing randomly for each card, so Pr(D|Hrandom) = (  )
 for
any sequence of responses D.
234
Adult−FullInfo Adult−Gleeb Adult−NoInfo
fost
grfost
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Figure 3: Adult participants classified according to the hypothesis we estimate each
adopted
unable to extract any useful generalisation from the training phase. Some partici-
pants (three) in the “no information” condition, however, did manage to classify the
test cards according to the correct fost criterion, purely on the basis of the distri-
bution of training cards. When we turn to the gleeb condition, we see an increase
in the number of participants who responded according to the correct fost criterion
(and a reduction in the number who responded randomly, seemingly unable to de-
tect a generalisation). When we distinguish only participants who adopted the fost
hypothesis and those who adopted another, this increase is marginally significant
by Fisher’s exact test; see Table 4.
As mentioned above, the only distinction between the “no information” con-
dition and the gleeb condition is the additional linguistic information, in the latter
case, that the correct underlying “liking criterion” is expressible as gleeb girls are
on the beach. This increase in successful responses is only predicted if gleeb can
be understood as fost. If gleeb could not be understood as fost, we would actually
predict a decrease in correct responses if anything, since the additional information
would rule out the puppet’s actual “liking criterion” and so participants should be
led away from the correct hypothesis.
These results indicate that the fictional determiner fost lies inside the space
of learnable natural language determiners, and therefore suggest that its typological
absence (unlike that of grall) should not be put down to intrinsic constraints im-
posed by the language faculty. One would need to be cautious in interpreting the
results of the adult participants in the gleeb condition alone, because of the possi-
bility that participants adopt a strategy of searching for the relevant generalisation
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fost other random other nonconservative other
Adult-NoInfo 3 8 7 4 1 10
Adult-Gleeb 7 4 0 11 3 8
Fisher’s exact test result p = 0.099 p = 0.002 p = 0.293
Table 4: The results of three different Fisher’s exact tests examining the distribu-
tions shown in Figure 3.
Adult−FullInfo Adult−Gleeb Adult−NoInfo Child−Gleeb
fost
grfost
grmost
most
random
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Figure 4: All participants classified according to the hypothesis we estimate each
adopted
while ignoring the explanations provided using gleeb. But the “no information”
condition provides a baseline measure of how successful this strategy can be, so
the key point is the relative increase in the number of fost repondents in the gleeb
condition over this baseline.
Table 4 shows two other analyses of the pattern in Figure 3. First, if we dis-
tinguish only the participants who adopted the random hypothesis from those who
adopted another, we find strong evidence (p = 0.002) that the extra information in
the gleeb condition correlated with a decrease in the number of “random” response
sets, indicating that there is at least some non-trivial restriction on the binary re-
lations expressible by natural language determiners. Second, there is no evidence
(p = 0.293) that the extra information in the gleeb condition correlated with an in-
crease in nonconservative (i.e. either grmost or grfost) response sets, despite the
appearance of such an increase in Figure 3.
Given this finding for adults, we analysed the responses from child partici-
pants (who were only tested in the gleeb condition) in the same way. The results are
shown alongside those of adults in Figure 4. The conclusions to draw from these
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are less obvious but some interesting observations can be made. In particular, no
child participant responded in accordance with either of the two nonconservative
hypothesised determiners, grmost or grfost; this provides additional support for the
conclusion we drew from Experiment 1, that children will not hypothesise noncon-
servative determiner meanings. Those who responded in accordance with any in-
correct determiner we considered all chose most, despite the fact every training card
provides evidence falsifying this possibility: JfostK(X)(Y) ⇐⇒ ¬JmostK(X)(Y). In
contrast, three of the six training cards were consistent with the grmost hypothesis
and four with the grfost hypothesis, yet these were never adopted.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented two experiments examining the relationship be-
tween learnability and typology in determiner meanings. A strong correlation is of-
ten thought to hold between learnability and typological generalisations, but recall
that only in one direction is this connection logically necessary. While an unlearn-
able determiner will of course not be found in any natural language, determiners
which are not found in any natural language need not — despite familiar reasons
to suspect so — necessarily be unlearnable. Our experiments have investigated two
typological generalisations in this light, only one of which, results indicate, consti-
tutes an instance of the conventionally suspected correlation. Specifically, we found
no evidence of participants successfully learning (unattested) nonconservative de-
terminer meanings, but did find evidence of participants successfully learning an
(unattested) determiner meaning “less than half” (which we call fost). This sug-
gests that the typological absence of nonconservative determiners can be put down
to unlearnability, but that the same cannot be said for the absence of fost; and in turn
gives us reason to prefer theories of natural language semantics that allow “less than
half”, but do not allow nonconservative relations, to be expressed as a determiner
meaning.
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